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ESSAY
FOR-PROFIT PHILANTHROPY
Dana Brakman Reiser*
This Essay examines Google's adoption of the novel and unorthodox for-
profit philanthropy model. Google created a division of its for-profit
company that is tasked with pursuing philanthropic activities. Specifically,
this division is responsible for addressing the global issues of climate
change, poverty, and emerging diseases. Of course, companies have long
blended philanthropic and business objectives. They make contributions,
commit to corporate social responsibility, or even form as social
enterprises. For-profit philanthropy, though, differs from these familiar
techniques in both structure and scale. Likewise, for-profit philanthropy
stands in stark contrast to the nonprofit, tax-exempt form of organization
typically used by those pursuing exclusively philanthropic endeavors. This
Essay investigates the for-profit philanthropy model, drawing out these
distinctions as well as the reasons why Google chose to adopt it. These
reasons reveal a fascinating mismatch between Google's philanthropic
vision and that of nonprofit law. Exploring this divergence exposes the
fundamental policy choices underlying the legal structures for
philanthropic activity, as well as the undertheorized boundary between
nonprofits and for-profits.
INTRODUCTION
Google is known for its innovative search methodology, pricing
structure, even employee benefits. When this for-profit corporation created
a philanthropic division, it grasped the mantle of philanthropic innovator as
well. This division stands alongside divisions for engineering, sales, and
finance, but is tasked with addressing climate change, poverty, and
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I am indebted to the formative comments I
received from participants in the Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum. I also appreciate the
support of Brooklyn Law School's Summer Research Program, the able research assistance
of Kate Fitzpatrick, Victoria Siesta, and Julia Sobol, the comments of panelists and attendees
at the Annual Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action
(ARNOVA) conference panel at which this work was presented, as well as suggestions by
Anita Brakman, Evelyn Brody, James Fishman, Roberta Griff, Garry Jenkins, Claire Kelly,
Debra Morris, Adam Parachin, Jeff Reiser, and Linda Sugin. I also benefited greatly from
exposure to papers and commentary presented at the 2008 conference of the NYU National
Center on Philanthropy and the Law, Structures at the Seam: The Architecture of Charities'
Commercial Activities. Any remaining errors are, of course, my own.
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emerging diseases. It is known as Google.org. This organizational
structure has been termed "for-profit philanthropy."' The for-profit
philanthropy structure distinguishes Google.org from the customary range
of corporate philanthropic practice. It also differentiates this model from
philanthropy pursued in the traditional organizational form: a tax-exempt,
nonprofit corporation. This Essay will explore Google.org and its for-profit
philanthropy model, drawing out the implications for nonprofit law, for-
profit law, and the boundary between them.
Part I introduces the Google.org phenomenon, describing its roots and
initiatives. It also identifies the major themes defining this experiment in
for-profit/nonprofit hybridization. Part II considers several other ways in
which for-profits engage in philanthropic activities: corporate charitable
contributions, corporate social responsibility, and social enterprise.
Comparing these examples with Google.org highlights the distinct
innovations of for-profit philanthropy. Part III explores the reasons that
Google undertook the for-profit philanthropy experiment, rather than using
a traditional philanthropic vehicle. While Google treasures any chance to
innovate, its reasons for adopting the for-profit philanthropy model are
linked to practical legal concerns. If structured using traditional
organizational forms, Google.org would be constrained in pursuing its
intended philanthropic strategies. Legal restrictions would frustrate its
desire to make for-profit investments, to directly access Google Inc.
resources, and to engage in political action, all in service of philanthropic
goals. This part details these restrictions, and in doing so, identifies a
fascinating mismatch between Google's philanthropic vision and that of
nonprofit law.
Part IV examines the implications of for-profit philanthropy and the
questions it raises, offering insights drawn from both nonprofit and for-
profit legal traditions. The nonprofit law perspective prompts difficult
questions about enforcement and about the limits, if any, on changing a for-
profit philanthropy's mission. A for-profit law perspective reminds us to
consider how adopting the for-profit philanthropy model might undermine
shareholder primacy, muddy fiduciary obligations, or both. Ultimately,
these perspectives combine to reveal the more fundamental questions that
for-profit philanthropy presents. In important ways, the law defining
nonprofit and for-profit forms also defines the boundaries of philanthropy
and business. For-profit philanthropy defies these limits. It challenges the
entire boundary-setting exercise and contests the utility and propriety of its
categories.
I. GOOGLE.ORG'S FOR-PROFIT PHILANTHROPY MODEL
Google Inc. is a widely known and fantastically successful public
company. It offers an ever-expanding array of products and services, first
1. See David Haskell, For-Profit Philanthropy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2006, § 6
(Magazine), at 50.
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and most notably its eponymous search engine.2 Google Inc. positions
itself as a different kind of company, and its actions support this claim. It
ran its initial public offering as a Dutch auction to give greater access to
small investors. 3 It offers unusual and extravagant employee benefits to
recruit top creative talent.4 It refuses to run lucrative pop-up ads, or indeed
any ads on its homepage. 5 It even took on "Don't be evil" as a kind of
corporate motto.6
Google Inc.'s goals also extend beyond the company. Its leaders "aspire
to make Google an institution that makes the world a better place," and
have pledged to commit one percent of the company's equity and profits to
philanthropic pursuits. 7 Here, too, Google Inc. has innovated. From its
inception as a public company, Google Inc. sponsored a traditional
corporate foundation.8 Yet, Google Inc.'s experiment with the for-profit
2. Google Inc. operates in myriad technological fields and grew exponentially virtually
from its inception. DAVID A. VISE & MARK MALSEED, THE GOOGLE STORY 1-9 (2005).
Although the current economic crisis has put a damper on business performance worldwide,
Google Inc. has stated that thus far it has continued to "perform[] well" and reported an
increase in revenues in the fourth quarter of 2008 over the previous quarter and the
corresponding quarter the year before. See Press Release, Google Investor Relations, Google
Announces Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2008 Results (Jan. 22, 2009), available at
http://investor.google.com/releases/2008Q4_google-eamings.html. Its core product remains
its web search technology and it "generate[s] revenue primarily by delivering relevant, cost-
effective online advertising." Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Feb. 15, 2008),
available at http://investor.google.com/documents/2007 .googleannual-report.html.
3. See Les Christie, The ABCs of a Unique IPO: The Hottest Tech IPO in Years Will
Be Run as a "Dutch Auction," CNNMONEY, Apr. 29, 2004, http://money.cnn.com/2004/
04/29/technology/googleauction (last visited March 3, 2009). In a Dutch auction, the issuer
solicits bids from would-be buyers of the initial public offering (IPO) stock for the number
of shares they desired to purchase and the price at which they would be willing to buy them.
The highest set of bids making up the number of shares the company has made available can
then purchase the shares; however, all bidders pay only the price bid by the lowest
successful bidder. See JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 124-25 (5th ed. 2006).
4. See Google, Google Jobs: Benefits, http://www.google.com/support/jobs/bin/
static.py?page=benefits.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2009) (describing benefits available to
Google employees ranging from health insurance, retirement savings, and employee stock
ownership plans to free food, employee shuttle services, and on-site laundromats); see also
Adam Lashinsky, Search and Enjoy, FORTUNE, Jan. 22, 2007, at 70; Robert Levering &
Milton Moskowitz, The 100 Best Companies to Work for 2008: The Rankings, FORTUNE,
Feb. 4, 2008, at 75 (ranking Google Inc. as the number one company to work for and
reporting that "[t]he company gives stock options to 99% of employees"); Robert Levering
& Milton Moskowitz, The 100 Best Companies to Work for 2007: In Good Company,
FORTUNE, Jan. 22, 2007, at 94 (same).
5. See VISE & MALSEED, supra note 2, at 6 (describing Google Inc.'s decision not to
include advertising on this "most valuable piece of real estate on the Internet"); Google,
Corporate Information: Are Pop-Up Ads Allowed on Google?, http://www.google.com/
corporate/nopopupads.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
6. Google Inc., Letter from the Founders: "An Owner's Manual" for Google's
Shareholders (Amendment No. 9 to Form S-1), at 27, 32 (Aug. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Letter
from the Founders], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/datal1288776/
0001 19312504142742/dsla.htm (referencing Warren Buffet's essays in his annual reports
and his An Owner's Manuel to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders).
7. Id.
8. Id. (noting the establishment of the Google Foundation).
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philanthropy concept has come to dominate its philanthropic program.
Google.org is the primary home and driver of Google Inc.'s philanthropic
activities. Today, Google.org "manage[s]" the Google Foundation, and the
company does not plan to make any additional contributions to fund the
foundation. 9  Google.org's most recent pronouncements promise to
"continue to iterate on our philanthropic model" away from traditional
philanthropic mechanisms and toward closer alignment with Google Inc. 10
Google.org is a division of Google Inc. tasked with pursuing the
company's philanthropic goals."I These goals aim broadly to address
"climate change, poverty and emerging disease," now focusing on several
more specific initiatives. 12 These initiatives employ a mix of methods.
Like traditional foundations, Google.org makes grants to nonprofit entities.
In addition, it makes equity investments in for-profit companies. Wherever
possible, Google.org is committed to using Google Inc.'s human resources,
technology, and products to pursue its philanthropic goals. Though its
purposes resonate with typical philanthropic pursuits and many companies
engage in philanthropic activities, Google.org's use of an integrated for-
profit division inaugurates a new model: for-profit philanthropy.
The current Google.org initiatives demonstrate many of the distinctive
elements of the for-profit philanthropy model. The first two focus on
projects to curb climate change: developing cost-effective renewable
energy sources (Renewable Energy Cheaper than Coal, or RE<C) and plug-
in vehicles for mass consumer use (RechargeIT). 13 As part of RE<C,
Google.org has become a key investor in companies researching renewable
energy technology.' 4 It also formed its own internal group to engage in
renewable energy research at the company's headquarters.1 5 In addition to
9. Google.org, About Us (2008) [hereinafter About Google.org], available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20080212020552/http://google.org/about.html; Posting of Sheryl
Sandberg, Vice President, Global Online Sales & Operations, Google.org, to The Official
Google Blog, http://googleblog.blogspot. com/2005/1 0/about-googleorg.html (Oct. 11, 2005,
9:02 PM) (stating that Google does not "expect to make further donations to the Foundation
for the foreseeable future").
10. Posting of Larry Brilliant, Chief Philanthropy Evangelist, Google.org, to The
Official Google.org Blog, http://blog.google.org/2009/02/next-chapter-for-googleorg.html
(Feb. 23, 2009, 4:14 PM) (describing Google.org's future plans in a posting about Dr.
Brilliant's change of role with the company).
11. Press reports often refer to Google.org as a subsidiary. See, e.g., Brad Stone, A
Subsidiary Charts Google's Next Frontier: Renewable Energy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007,
at C3. Google.org's own public materials do not address this question directly. Whether the
division is housed in a separate wholly owned subsidiary or is an unincorporated unit within
Google Inc., Google.org clearly operates as a for-profit enterprise within the Google Inc.
umbrella.
12. Google.org, Searching for Solutions, http://www.google.org/index.html (last visited
Feb. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Searching for Solutions].
13. Google.org, Plug into a Greener Grid: RE<C and RechargelT, http://www.google.
org/rec.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2009) [hereinafter A Greener Grid].
14. Id.
15. Id.; see also Google, Google Is Committed to Helping Build a Clean Energy Future,
and We Need Your Help, http://www.google.com/jobs/energy/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2009)
[hereinafter Cleaner Energy Future].
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a series of grants to nonprofit research institutes and advocacy projects,
RechargelT collaborates with a series of large and small for-profit
companies engaged in the energy, automotive and plug-in industries. 16
The Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SME) initiative seeks to
encourage the creation and growth of these businesses in developing
countries.' 7 This initiative likewise includes traditional grants to nonprofit
organizations supporting entrepreneurship. 18  Breaking from these
traditional means, however, Google.org and two partners invested $17
million to create the Small to Medium Enterprise Investment Company for
India, a for-profit investment fund.19 The SME initiative also works to
generate private investment and increase liquidity in their capital markets,
such as by linking investors with information about developing country
SMEs.20 In late December 2008, Google.org announced its decision to put
the "SME initiative on the back burner" in order to focus more on other
initiatives. 2 1 Still, Google.org has promised to honor its commitments
under existing grants and investments in the SME space.
In its announcement de-emphasizing SME, Google.org specifically
mentioned its desire to focus more on its Inform & Empower (I&E)
initiative. This initiative focuses on India and East Africa, working to
supply information regarding education, health, water, and sanitation to
underserved communities. 22  Google.org expects that making this
information available will empower individuals and communities to
demand change from their governments.2 3 To pursue these goals, I&E has
thus far made many grants to nonprofit research and advocacy groups, and
contracted with a few individuals and for-profit companies, primarily in-
country in the target areas. 24 Google.org's final initiative to date, Predict
and Prevent (PnP), focuses on tracking emerging diseases. PnP funds
16. Google.org, RechargelT.org: A Google.org Project: What We Are Doing,
http://www.google.org/recharge/overview.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2009) [hereinafter
RechargelT.org].
17. See Google.org, Fuel Growth of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (Jan. 2008)
[hereinafter SME Brief], available at http://www.google.org/SMEBrief.pdf.
18. Google.org, Grants and Investments, http://www.google.org/projects.html (last
visited Feb. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Grants and Investments].
19. Press Release, Google.org, Soros Economic Development Fund, Omidyar Network
and Google.org Launch Small to Medium Enterprise Investment Company for India (Feb.
19, 2008), available at http://www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/20080219_omidyar_
googleorg.html.
20. See SME Brief, supra note 17.
21. Posting of Sonal Shah to The Official Google.org Blog, http:/Iblog.google.org/2008/
12/sharpening-our-focus-in-global.html (Dec. 23, 2008, 10:39 AM).
22. Google.org, Inform and Empower to Improve Public Services,
http://www.google.org/inform.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Inform and
Empower]; see also Google.org, Inform and Empower to Improve Public Services (Jan.
2008) [hereinafter I&E Brief], available at http://www.google.org/InformEmpower_
Brief.pdf.
23. Inform and Empower, supra note 22; see also I&E Brief, supra note 22. In addition,
Inform & Empower (I&E) will provide public sector and civil society groups with data and
analytical tools to respond to the calls for change it anticipates. Id.
24. Grants and Investments, supra note 18.
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nonprofit organizations and academic research groups engaging in data
collection, monitoring, and other efforts to track disease outbreaks,
primarily in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.25 While these two
initiatives have so far used only traditional mechanisms, their lofty
objectives and reliance on the power of information suggest that a range of
techniques will be employed over time.
Together these initiatives make up an ambitious and diverse
philanthropic program. Still, commonalities of Google.org's approach
emerge. Google.org leverages Google Inc.'s financial, human, and
technological resources, utilizing its business competencies and products.
Further, it relies on skills, methodologies, and ideas gleaned from Google
Inc.'s for-profit success. Moreover, Google.org's initiatives are highly
reliant on the power of information 26-Google Inc.'s stock in trade. These
tenets of the Google.org approach differentiate it from a traditional charity,
although its conservation, public health, and antipoverty mission would also
be appropriate for a nonprofit, tax-exempt entity. Further, these common
threads shed some light on the philosophy behind Google Inc.'s pursuit of a
for-profit philanthropy model.
As a division of Google Inc., Google.org is poised to exploit the
company's wealth, human resources, technology, and business products in
service of its philanthropic goals. The Google.org initiatives already
comprise sizeable financial outlays. It has made grants to a wide range of
nonprofit partners. 27 Google.org also is heavily seeding several for-profit
ventures linked to its philanthropic initiatives. The $17 million in initial
start-up funds for the Small to Medium Enterprise Investment Company for
India is just one of the most recent of these. RE<C has invested over $35
million in cutting-edge companies working on solar, wind, and geothermal
energy capabilities. 28 In late 2007, Google.org requested proposals for up
to $10 million of investment capital as part of RechargelT. 29 The request
clarified that it would consider only for-profit partners, though investments
25. Id.; Google.org, Predict and Prevent, http://www.google.org/predict.html (last
visited Feb. 20, 2009); see also Google.org, Predict and Prevent (Oct. 14, 2008) [hereinafter
PnP Brief], available at http://www.google.org/PredictPreventBrief.pdf.
26. Searching for Solutions, supra note 12 ("Google.org aspires to use the power of
information and technology to address the global challenges of our age: climate change,
poverty and emerging disease."); Posting of Larry Brilliant to The Official Google.org Blog,
supra note 10 ("[Olur greatest impact has come when we've attacked problems in ways that
make the most of Google's strengths in technology and information .....
27. Grants and Investments, supra note 18.
28. Id.; Google, Going Green at Google: Powering a Clean Energy Revolution,
http://www.google.com/corporate/green/clean-energy.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2009)
[hereinafter Powering a Clean Energy Revolution] (describing Google.org's investments in
several solar, wind, and other alternative energy companies).
29. Google.org, RechargelT.org: A Google.org Project, RechargelT Request for
Investment Proposals, http://www.google.org/recharge/rfp/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2009)
[hereinafter RechargeIT Request for Investment Proposals]; see also Press Release, Google
Press Ctr., Google.org Launches $10 Million Request for Investment Proposals to Advance
Sustainable Transportation Solutions (Sept. 12, 2007), available at http://www.google.com/
intli/en/press/annc/rechargerfp.html.
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made under it would be bolstered by prior and continuing grants to
nonprofit research and policy organizations. 30 To date, Google.org's grants
and investments have exceeded $100 million. 31 Its financial commitments
are large and diverse, and appear to be growing. 32
Google.org also taps Google Inc.'s valuable human resources, and its
ability to attract and recruit top talent. This idea has been taken furthest in
Google.org's RE<C initiative. As mentioned above, RE<C includes an
internal research and development group to study renewable energy. This
group is part of Google Inc.'s engineering organization and is currently
advertising new positions. 33 Google.org relies on or plans to utilize Google
Inc.'s human resources in its other initiatives too. It described its plan to
focus more attention on I&E as spurred in part by "Google.org's unique
strengths-including the ability to tap Google engineers to build and link
better pathways to information." 34 RechargeIT's demonstration plug-in
fleet is available as part of an employee car-sharing fleet program. 35
Employee use of the cars generates data used for future research to improve
the plug-in technology. Google Inc. personnel are a key resource for
Google.org's programs, one it will continue to mine.36
Finally, Google.org can leverage Google Inc.'s technological resources,
business projects, and products. Data on the RechargelT fleet's
performance is collected via software Google Inc. developed, and this data
is disseminated through the company's websites. 37 Predict and Prevent
plans to provide disease warnings through real time data-sharing,
"leverage[ing] existing Google tools and resources." 38  Inform and
Empower plans to assist governments and policymakers in "[e]xpanding
service delivery with innovative information-based tools." 39 Google Inc.
30. RechargelT Request for Investment Proposals, supra note 29.
31. Grants and Investments, supra note 18.
32. Face Value: Google's Guru of Giving, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2008, at 75 ("If the
pilots go well, Google.org plans to scale up fast . .
33. Clean Energy Future, supra note 15.
34. Posting of Sonal Shah to The Official Google.org Blog, supra note 21. Similarly, in
its former efforts in the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) area, Google.org
explained that Google Inc. software engineers would work alongside for-profit partners to
develop the informational and investment tools necessary to establish and mature a global
SME capital market. SME Brief, supra note 17.
35. RechargelT.org, supra note 16; see also Felicity Barringer & Matthew L. Wald,
Google and Utility to Test Hybrids that Sell Back Power, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2007, at C3
("The six vehicles are used by Google employees near the company's Mountain View
headquarters, and sit under a carport with a roof of solar cells.").
36. See Posting of Larry Brilliant to The Official Google.org Blog, supra note 10
(announcing that "Google [Inc.] has decided to put even more engineers and technical talent
to work on... issues and problems" addressed by Google.org).
37. See Google.org, RechargeIT: A Google.org Project: Our Fleet, http://www.google.
org/recharge/dashboard (last visited Feb. 20, 2009) (providing links for each of the six cars
and maintaining a calendar for each date that data is available, along with event summaries).
38. PnP Brief, supra note 25, at 4.
39. Inform and Empower, supra note 22. Before its move to the back burner, the SME
initiative also contemplated "partner[ing] on Google.com projects." SME Brief, supra note
17.
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will no doubt be a potential source for procuring them. Google.org will
continue to partner with Google Inc. to collect, manage, and deploy the
information its initiatives count on, and will rely on its human and
technological resources to do so.40
Although operating outside of the Google.org flagship initiatives, the
Google Grants program also uses Google Inc.'s business products in service
of its philanthropic goals. This program awards advertising to selected
nonprofit organizations. The ads appear next to Google's search results
when users search on targeted terms related to the nonprofit's mission and
programs. The free advertising can be used to "raise awareness and
increase traffic." 4 1 Each grant includes at least three months of free
advertising, which may be valued at up to $10,000 per month.4 2 The ads
operate as an in-kind contribution program, providing for free to chosen
nonprofits the valuable services Google Inc. sells to other advertisers.
Through this program, Google.org leverages Google Inc.'s most profitable
product-advertising 43-to support philanthropic ends.
Beyond these concrete relationships with Google Inc., Google.org's
methodology is infused with the vision that made the company a for-profit
success. In its policy documents, Google.org speaks of the importance of
moving from top-down to bottom-up visions of change, 44 of the importance
of speed, 45 and of lowering transaction costs. 46  These tenets of
Google.org's vision are traceable to the corporate philosophy of Google
Inc. "Democracy on the web works"-Google Inc.'s innovative bottom-up
approach to ranking search results-is one of Google Inc.'s ten truths. 47 So
is "Fast is better than slow." 48 Likewise, Google Inc.'s principles of design
stress that "every millisecond counts." 49  Google Inc. underscores the
importance of lowering the costs of search transactions when it advocates
40. Posting of Larry Brilliant to The Official Google.org Blog, supra note 10 ("By
aligning Google.org more closely with Google as a whole, [Google.org's leadership] will
ensure that we're better able to build innovative, scalable technology and information
solutions.").
41. Google for Non-Profits, Google Grants: Reach and Engage Your Supporters
Through Free Online Advertising, http://www.google.com/nonprofits/grantstutorial.html
(last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
42. Breezo-What Is Google Grants?, http://services.google.com/grants/edu/what/ (last
visited Feb. 20, 2009).
43. Google, Investor Relations: Investor FAQ, http://investor.google.com/faq.html#money
(last visited Feb. 10, 2009) (noting, in response to the FAQ "How does Google make
money?" that "the majority of our revenue comes from advertising").
44. I&E Brief, supra note 22.
45. See, e.g., A Greener Grid, supra note 13 (describing Google.org's efforts to produce
renewable energy "in years, not decades" and to "accelerate mass commercialization of
plug-in vehicles").
46. SME Brief, supra note 17.
47. Google, Corporate Information: Our Philosophy, http://www.google.com/corporate/
tenthings.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
48. Id.
49. Google, Corporate Information: Google User Experience, http://www.google.com/
corporate/ux.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
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simplicity and eschews distraction. 50 Finally, and most prominently, both
Google.org documents and the broader range of Google Inc. materials are
riddled with references to the power of information. 51
Google.org partner organizations also demonstrate a commitment to
business skills, methodologies, and vision. Even nonprofit partners often
tout their market orientation. The core principles of the Rocky Mountain
Institute, a nonprofit grantee in the RechargelT initiative, include
embracing "Market-Oriented Solutions" and a commitment to "natural
capitalism. ' 52 CalCars, another RechargelT grantee, describes itself as a
"startup" organization, echoing Google's roots as a small business.53 The
website of TechnoServe, an SME initiative grantee, proclaims "Social
change has a business plan." 54 At times, funding recipients even adopt a
hybrid approach of their own. Pratham, an Indian nongovernmental
organization (NGO) and grantee in the I&E initiative, relies on a "triangular
partnership" among corporate leaders, government, and community
members. 55 Google.org has funded a wide variety of grantees and for-
profit partners who both promote their programmatic goals and share their
philanthropic vision. This shared vision often includes the notion that
business ideas, skills, and methodologies are essential links in achieving
social change.
The for-profit philanthropy model itself, of course, is a testament to
Google Inc.'s faith in the power of its for-profit vision. Google.org's
creators and managers could have continued their philanthropic activities
using the Google Foundation, a traditional corporate foundation already in
existence and making grants. Instead, they struck out to create Google.org
and have essentially halted funding to the foundation. 56 Their belief that
achieving ambitious social goals requires them to draw on Google Inc.'s
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Searching for Solutions, supra note 12 ("Google.org aspires to use the
power of information and technology to address the global challenges of our age."); Google,
Corporate Information: Company Overview, http://www.google.com/corporate/index.html
(last visited Feb. 20, 2009) ("Google's mission is to organize the world's information and
make it universally accessible and useful.").
52. Rocky Mountain Institute, Natural Capitalism: Companies Can Profit from the
Principles of Natural Capitalism, http://www.rmi.org/sitepages/pid69.php (last visited Feb.
20, 2009).
53. CalCars: The California Cars Initiative, http://www.calcars.org/ (last visited Feb.
20, 2009).
54. TechnoServe: Business Solutions to Poverty, http://www.technoserve.org/ (last
visited Feb. 20, 2009). Other SME grantees, the Acumen Fund and the Grameen
Foundation, have similar missions to battle poverty through supporting entrepreneurship. See
Acumen Fund Blog, http://www.acumenfundblog.org/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2009); Grameen
Foundation: Fighting Poverty with Microfinance, http://www.grameenfoundation.org/ (last
visited Feb. 20, 2009).
55. Pratham, About Us, http://www.pratham.org/aboutus/aboutus.php (last visited Feb.
20, 2009).
56. Posting of Sheryl Sandberg to The Official Google Blog, supra note 9. This Essay's
inquiry focuses on the unique mechanism of a for-profit philanthropic division, and its
references to the for-profit philanthropy model and Google.org thus denote this division
rather than any remaining activities of the traditional Google Foundation.
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business methods and assets stirred them to develop their for-profit
philanthropy model.
II. THE FORBEARS OF FOR-PROFIT PHILANTHROPY
Another key to Google.org's for-profit philanthropy model is Google's
desire to be an innovator in all respects. The Google brand is founded on
the idea that it is a unique company, with a distinct business model. Google
Inc. and its leaders rightfully view innovation in philanthropy as a way to
further this public image. 57 The idea of blending philanthropic impulses
with business activities, though, is not unknown. The notion that
companies should use their business skills and resources to pursue needs
beyond those of their shareholders, and indeed have the responsibility to do
so, has a long historical pedigree. This part canvasses three familiar
methods for blending business and philanthropy and illustrates how
Google.org is different.
Perhaps the most mundane example of philanthropy by for-profit entities
is the corporate charitable contribution. Corporations make these
contributions for various reasons: to gain media exposure with consumers
and future employees, build goodwill with their communities, and prop
their brands as companies that care. Of course, some economists criticize
corporate charitable contributions as careless or inefficient expenditures. 58
Legal commentators have made similar criticisms and also argued that
contributions are made more to improve the reputations of CEOs, directors,
and managers than the companies and shareholders these fiduciaries
serve. 59 Despite these complaints and some early attempts by courts to
curtail the practice, corporate contributions have gained widespread legal
acceptance 60 and are an expected norm of business practice. 6'
57. Jim Hopkins, Google Foundation May Invest in For-Profit Firms, USA TODAY, Apr.
27, 2005, at 1B (noting that innovation in philanthropy meshes with Google Inc.'s overall
branding).
58. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 135-36 (1962).
59. See, e.g., R. Frank Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Giving at the Office: A
Reappraisal of Charitable Contributions by Corporations, 54 Bus. LAW. 965, 968, 982-83
(1999); Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of
Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 611-27 (2003); see also Victor Brudney &
Allen Ferrell, Corporate Charitable Giving, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1191, 1198 (2002)
(suggesting shareholders rather than managers should be permitted to select corporate
donees for this and other reasons).
60. Every state has enacted statutes specifically permitting charitable contributions by
corporations. See Balotti & Hanks, supra note 59, at 970-73; see also JAMES D. Cox,
THOMAS LEE HAZEN & F. HODGE O'NEAL, CORPORATIONS § 4.4 (1997); PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (1994) (asserting that
corporations may devote reasonable amounts to philanthropic activities "even if corporate
profit and shareholder gain are not.., enhanced").
61. Bus. ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 34 (2005) (asserting
that corporations have the responsibility to be good citizens, which includes making
charitable contributions).
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Corporate contributions have flourished, totaling $15.69 billion in
2007.62 Of this sum, twenty-eight percent was donated through corporate
foundations and the balance directly to operating charities or needy
individuals. 63 Nor has corporate generosity been limited to cash donations;
an estimated one-third to one-half of corporate giving takes the form of in-
kind contributions. 64 Some firms combine a range of contribution styles,
with a few even making broad company-wide commitments to giving.65
Cause-related marketing, where consumers are offered a charitable
contribution packaged with their purchase, also continues to grow. 66
Likewise, corporate sponsorships of charity events and programs are legion.
For-profit leaders clearly believe that making corporate contributions is
good for their businesses, and many are integrating philanthropy into their
broader corporate strategies. 67
Google.org might be viewed simply as a significant corporate
contribution; Google Inc. has committed to dedicate one percent of its
equity and profits to philanthropy. The arguments justifying corporate
contributions certainly hold true in this case. Press accounts chronicled the
initial announcement of Google.org and the media has traced its every step,
generating significant positive publicity. 68 As a company operating on the
Internet, Google.org's projects around the globe resonate with Google
Inc.'s potential customers and partners, building on its already behemoth
presence in the virtual community. Additionally, several of Google.org's
initiatives have a particular nexus with its home community in Mountain
62. GIVING USA FOUND., GIVING USA 2008: THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY
FOR THE YEAR 2007, at 10 (2008).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 81.
65. Salesforce.com, a purveyor of customer relationship management software, follows
a 1% time, 1% equity, and 1% product philanthropy program. See Salesforce.com
Foundation, http://www.salesforce.com/foundation/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). Its
"employees are encouraged to donate one percent of their working time to the community,"
the company donated one percent of its equity to its corporate foundation at its founding, and
it seeks to give away one percent of its product by donating or discounting its software
licenses for nonprofits. Id.
66. The entire business model of Working Assets, a credit card company, and its
affiliated mobile company, Credo, are founded on this practice. These companies promise
consumers that they will donate a portion of each purchase consumers make with them to a
range of progressive organizations. Working Assets, About Working Assets,
http://www.workingassets.com/About.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). Customers may
even nominate and vote on the year's roster of donees on the company's website. See id.
67. GIVING USA FOUND., supra note 62, at 80 ("Aligning philanthropy with business
goals has been a major trend in the corporate world for a number of years.").
68. See, e.g., Chris Gaither, Google Sets Aside $1 Billion for Causes, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
12, 2005, at C2 (describing the initial funding of Google.org and its unusual for-profit
structure); Katie Hafner, Philanthropy Google's Way: Not the Usual, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
2006, at Al (reporting on Google.org's early initiatives and the appointment its first
executive director); Haskell, supra note 1 (including Google.org's for-profit philanthropy
model in its sixth annual ideas issue); Harriet Rubin, Google's Searches Now Include Ways
to Make a Better World, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2008, at CI (detailing the Google.org
initiatives).
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View, California. 69  More generally, the idea that Google Inc. is
contributing to philanthropic endeavors on a substantial scale meshes with
and bolsters its image as a company gaining success without "being evil."
Yet, Google.org differs from the corporate contribution model in
significant respects. Corporate contributions take corporate largesse out of
the company's coffers and place it with external charities, or at least a
separately incorporated and managed nonprofit foundation. Google.org's
status as a division of Google Inc. keeps control over philanthropic funds,
and the funds themselves, firmly within the confines of the business
organization.70 Further, Google Inc. has integrated its philanthropic goals
more fully into its business model than do corporate contributors.
The extent and reach of Google Inc.'s philanthropic commitments
resonate with the idea of corporate social responsibility (CSR). This
concept suggests corporations should go further than mere donations in
pursuit of community and societal aims. Rather, the various CSR
movements have proposed that corporations and their leaders be permitted
or required to consider interests beyond those of shareholders in their
everyday business decisions. 71  Like corporate contributors, the CSR
concept has drawn consistent, and often withering, criticism. 72 Yet, the
idea is tenacious. Today it has strong, though not unqualified, legal
support. 73
More importantly, CSR has become a fundamental trope in the rhetoric
and culture of large corporations. 74 Both as advocated and adopted, CSR
69. Stone, supra note 11; Powering a Clean Energy Revolution, supra note 28 (reporting
that Google's offices and data centers became carbon neutral in 2007, and in June 2007,
completed a 1.6MV solar installation at the company headquarters-the largest U.S.
corporate installation at that time); RechargelT.org, supra note 16 (describing the
demonstration plug-in fleet located at the company's headquarters).
70. Again, recall that the focus here is on the activities of Google Inc.'s philanthropy
division and leaves to one side those of its retreating traditional Google Foundation.
71. Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance "Reform" and the New Corporate
Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605 (2001); C. A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of
Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century,
51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002).
72. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32; see also Wells, supra note 71, at 109-10,
123-25 (noting Friedman's opposition and that of earlier commentators Henry Manne and
Yale Law School Dean Eugene V. Rostow).
73. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 733, 738-39 (2005) (describing the view that corporate leaders must act to maximize
profits as canonical but overstated, considering statutory and other legal support for
corporate actions motivated by social responsibility).
74. DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 6-12 (2005) (describing the pervasiveness of CSR);
Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for Actualizing Social
Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771, 773 (2007) ("Virtually every corporation not
only professes a desire to engage in charitable endeavors but also generates a report
regarding those endeavors."); see also, e.g., ExxonMobil, Corporate Citizenship at
ExxonMobil, http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/community-ccr-overview.aspx (last
visited Feb. 20, 2009) ("At ExxonMobil, corporate citizenship is embedded in our business
model and effectively integrates good corporate governance, safety, and environmental and
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means companies view a responsibility to community and society as more
than an occasional philanthropic impulse. Companies committed to CSR
bring consideration of social impact into the mainstream of their business
operations. In addition to sponsoring corporate foundations and making
both cash and in-kind donations, these companies speak of leveraging
employee time and partnering with organizations and enterprises in
underserved communities. They trumpet themselves not purely as engines
of profit, but as responsible corporate citizens and agents of change. Some
companies seek to distinguish their brands as leaders in CSR.75 Many
others simply recognize that a respectable level of CSR commitment is an
indispensable part of any modem company's public image. 76 The CSR
theme can now be found across corporate America and beyond.
Google.org aligns with this CSR paradigm. Google Inc. does not purport
to view "the business of business as business" with philanthropy as a public
relations move or a sideline. The Google.org division considers social
impact when it makes business decisions. Its very existence integrates
Google's philanthropic vision within its corporate operations. But,
Google.org differs from CSR in both scope and structure. CSR asks
companies to be mindful of the impact their decisions will have on
constituencies other than shareholders. At times, this rubric will motivate
for-profits to take actions to minimize harm to those constituencies, perhaps
even actively to help them. Google.org goes well beyond CSR's aims of
awareness and consideration. Funding a division to engage solely in
philanthropic activities is a much more ambitious and specific approach
than merely adding social impact to the mix of factors considered whenever
business leaders make decisions. The for-profit philanthropy model is thus
distinct from what is typically contemplated by CSR's proponents. There
are, however, companies that use philanthropic vision to guide areas of
their business, or even build an entire business model around philanthropic
ideals.
These for-profit companies have joined business and social goals as the
foundation of their corporations. Although this phenomenon has been
social responsibility into all aspects of our global business."); General Motors, 2006
Corporate Responsibility Report: Our Message: Chairman's Message, http://www.gm.
com/corporate/responsibility/reports/06/100_message/100.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2009)
(asserting a "commit[ment] to sound corporate citizenship in all aspects of [its] business");
Microsoft, Microsoft Corporate Citizenship: Community Engagement and Investment,
http://www.microsoft.com/About/CorporateCitizenship/us/Communitylnvestment/default.m
spx (last visited Feb. 20, 2009) (accepting Microsoft's "responsibility to apply its expertise
in software to helping people, particularly people in underserved communities" and noting
projects including partnerships and devotion of employee time).
75. The Timberland Company prominently promotes its CSR strategy on its website,
providing reports on key CSR performance indicators on a quarterly basis and publishing a
comprehensive biannual report. Timberland, About Timberland: Corporate Social
Responsibility, http://www.timberland.com/corp/index.jsp?page=csroverview (last visited
Feb. 10, 2009).
76. The Good Company, ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2005, at 3; Just Good Business,
ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2008, at 4.
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called by a host of names, the term "social enterprise" will be used here.77
Social enterprises integrate philanthropy into their business models at a
more basic level than companies that make corporate contributions or
practice CSR. Social entrepreneurs pursue social and business goals
together, viewing them as synergistic and mutually reinforcing, as equal
partners in their business vision. This deep and particular commitment to
philanthropic endeavor is the thrust of the social enterprise ideal.
The precise point where a social enterprise brings social concerns into its
business processes varies widely. 78 Social enterprise firms may marry their
business and social missions when obtaining the supplies they need to make
their products. 79 While other, more cost-effective and therefore profit-
maximizing sources might be available, these companies choose their
partners to achieve social aims. Social enterprises may steer the
employment opportunities they provide to the impoverished, individuals
with disabilities, or those reentering society following incarceration.80
They may produce their wares with environmental impact and profit as
equal criteria for judging success. 81 Much of the microfinance movement is
based on a vision that there is both social good and profit to be made from
lending to poor individuals formerly unable to access credit.82 Even
77. James J. Fishman, Wrong Way Corrigan and Recent Developments in the Nonprofit
Landscape: A Need for New Legal Approaches, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 568 (2007)
(using "social enterprise" as an umbrella term); cf James Austin, Howard Stevenson & Jane
Wei-Skillem, Social and Commercial Entrepreneurship: Same, Different, or Both?, 30
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THEORY & PRAC. 1, 2 (2006) (using "social entrepreneurship"); J.
Gregory Dees & Beth Battle Anderson, For-Profit Social Ventures, in SOCIAL
ENTREPRENEURSHIP (Marilyn L. Kourilsky & William B. Walstad eds., 2003) (using "for-
profit social venture"); Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient
Truth of How the Business Judgment Rule Protects a Board's Decision to Engage in Social
Entrepreneurship, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 624 (2007) (using "social entrepreneurship"
and other terms).
78. Dees & Anderson, supra note 77, at 3-5.
79. Ben & Jeny's Homemade, Inc. sources milk and cream from a local cooperative,
brownies from another social enterprise (a bakery providing job-training), and much of its
vanilla, coffee, and cocoa from cooperatives of poor farmers. Ben & Jerry's, Activism:
Inside the Pint, http://www.benjerry.com/activism/inside-the-pint/ (last visited Mar. 25,
2009). The fair-trade sourcing policies now in effect at many companies proceed on a
similar footing.
80. See, e.g., Christopher St. John, The Humanitarian Divide: A Cambodian 'Nonprofit
Company' Peddles Digitization-With a Social Edge, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Spring
2004, at 52, 53 (describing Digital Divide Data, a company founded on the idea of providing
jobs for poor Cambodians).
81. See, e.g., Leslie Berger, Garden- Variety Revolution: TerraCycle Turns What Others
Leave Behind into Fertilizers and Fashion, STAN. Soc. INNOVATION REV., Spring 2008, at 73
(describing the social enterprise, TerraCycle, which uses environmentally friendly processes
to produce plant fertilizer from worm waste); Rob Walker, The Worm Turns, N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 32 (same).
82. See, e.g., Grameen Bank, General Questions on Grameen Bank FAQ,
http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com-easyfaq&task=cat&catid=80&ltemid =
524 (last visited Feb. 20, 2009) (describing Grameen's business plan to lend to poor
borrowers and its intention and achievement of profits).
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investment policies can be founded on philanthropic vision.83 Rather than
merely committing to be mindful of social concerns as they proceed with
their business ventures, these organizations place philanthropic and profit-
making goals on a par from the outset and at the very core of their business
models. Profit remains a central goal, but not the exclusive one.
Google.org's for-profit philanthropy is certainly related to social
enterprise, but again several aspects differentiate it. First are the related
features of size and scope. Social enterprise companies are often small and
controlled by owners who have a personal commitment to their social
goals.84 A few have begun that way, but grew quite large as a result of their
success. By comparison, Google.org is a division of a mammoth publicly
owned company, and Google.org's scale, determined as a percentage of
Google Inc.'s equity and profits, is infinite. Of course, Google Inc. has
social commitments, perhaps more than most companies of its age and size.
Yet, in the general range of its business, these do not have an equal place
with building a financially successful company. 85 Profit and business
imperatives figure too strongly in Google Inc.'s overall decision making to
view the entire company as a social enterprise.
If considered standing alone, Google.org comes closer to fitting the
social enterprise category. In the Google.org division, social mission is
wholly mixed with business ethos. Its initiatives target areas of operation to
maximize philanthropic impact. Simultaneously, it brings business acumen
and a desire for efficiency, speed, and knowledge management to transform
social conditions. Google.org also takes its social values very seriously
when determining its means and mode of production. Social goals are
deeply embedded in the Google.org business model. This is the very crux
of the for-profit philanthropy ideal.
83. See, e.g., Acumen Fund Blog, About, http://blog.acumenfund.org/about/ (last visited
Mar. 25, 2009) ("Acumen Fund is a non-profit global venture fund that uses entrepreneurial
approaches to solve the problems of global poverty."); Omidyar Network, Portfolio,
http://www.omidyar.com/portfolio (last visited Mar. 24, 2009) ("We fund and help scale
both for-profit companies and nonprofit organizations around the world to catalyze broad,
positive social impact.").
84. Michael Chertok, Jeff Hamaoui & Eliot Jamison, The Funding Gap, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION REV, Spring 2008, at 44 (describing the difficulties in financing faced by social
enterprises desiring to expand); Dees & Anderson, supra note 77, at 17-19 (describing the
need for social enterprises to remain controlled by owners sympathetic to their dual
mission); Gregory Dees, Beth Battle Anderson & Jane Wei-Skillern, Scaling Social Impact:
Strategies for Spreading Social Innovations, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Spring 2004, at
24 (offering advice for the social entrepreneurs facing the common difficulty of increasing
the scale of their enterprises); Jim Schorr, Social Enterprise 2.0: Moving Toward a
Sustainable Model, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Summer 2006, at 12 (same). See also
generally JOHN ELKINGTON & PAMELA HARTIGAN, THE POWER OF UNREASONABLE PEOPLE
179-96 (2008) (discussing the challenges of "scaling" up).
85. Andy Serwer, Larry Page on How to Change the World, FORTUNE, May 12, 2008, at
82, 86 (quoting the Google founder, who states "70% of our resources are spent in our core
business and 10% end up in unrelated projects, like energy or whatever. [The other 20%
goes to projects adjacent to the core business.] Actually, it's a struggle to get it to even be
10%." (alteration in original)).
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Still, Google.org is also not a perfect fit with social enterprise. It is
artificial to consider it in isolation from its Google Inc. whole.
Furthermore, Google.org is actually too focused on social mission to match
the social enterprise category precisely. Google.org views profit as a
distant and unlikely possible consequence of its activities. Its leaders have
emphasized, "'[w]e're not doing it for the profit. And if we didn't get our
capital back, so what? The emphasis is on social returns, not economic
retums."' 86  This nonchalance lacks the passion for the coexistence of
social mission and profit that drives social enterprise.
Blending philanthropy and business has long been in fashion and entities
have pursued it in a variety of ways.87 In fact, calls for capitalism to
spearhead solutions to society's greatest problems are mounting all the
time.8 8 The three variants assessed in this part are exemplary, but do not
offer an exhaustive catalogue. By comparison, though, the for-profit
philanthropy model offers genuine innovation. It envisions a division
within a for-profit company tasked solely with pursuing philanthropy. This
division engages in major initiatives, but the core business remains
primarily devoted to profit maximization. Google.org has pushed the for-
profit philanthropy model forward and provided it with significant
prominence. The next part considers Google.org's reasons for embarking
on this innovation, many of which are grounded on legal limitations it
desired to avoid.
III. THE REASONS FOR FOR-PROFIT PHILANTHROPY
Just as it differs from its for-profit forbears, Google.org is significantly
and intentionally distinct from traditional philanthropic forms. As
compared with a tax-exempt nonprofit entity, the for-profit Google.org
division has greater freedom to invest, direct access to Google Inc.'s
resources, and more ability to engage in political activities. 89 State and
federal law applicable to traditionally organized philanthropic entities
would curtail all of these, in differing ways and to varying degrees. This
part explains how these legal limits would frustrate Google.org's strategy.
Prior to that, however, it is important to specify the benefits attendant to
traditional legal forms for philanthropic activity. This clarifies what
Google.org gives up in exchange for the freedom of investment, direct
access, and political flexibility it gains by using a for-profit structure. A
nonprofit incorporated under state law obtains status as a separate entity
86. Hafner, supra note 68 (quoting then-Google.org Executive Director Dr. Larry
Brilliant).
87. See, e.g., Fishman, supra note 77, at 603-06.
88. See generally MATTHEW BISHOP & MICHAEL GREEN, PHILANTHROCAPITALISM: How
THE RICH CAN SAVE THE WORLD (2008); MICHAEL EDWARDS, JUST ANOTHER EMPEROR? THE
MYTHS AND REALITIES OF PHILANTHROCAPITALISM (2008); The Birth of
Philanthrocapitalism, ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 2006, at 8.
89. About Google.org, supra note 9 (explaining that its structure permits it to "invest in
for-profit endeavors," "lobby for policies that support [its] philanthropic goals," and "tap
Google's innovative technology and, most importantly, its inspired workforce").
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with the ability to transact in its own name and limited liability for its
members, if any. 90  Of course, incorporated for-profit firms are also
characterized by corporate personhood and limited liability. In addition,
however, state law often offers property tax exemption, exemption from
sales and use taxes, and even limitations on tort liability to nonprofit
charities. 91 These benefits would not likely be extended to Google.org.
Philanthropic groups organized along traditional lines also can qualify
for tax benefits under federal law. As the tax-exempt label suggests,
principal among these is exemption from corporate taxation on net
income. 92 Of course, for philanthropic groups running at a loss, this
exemption is not necessarily a great boon. Moreover, a for-profit division
like Google.org might well be able to set off its losses against gains in other
portions of Google Inc.'s business. 93 Thus, for Google.org, exemption
could be a less desirable alternative than taxability. Another important
federal tax benefit is the ability to offer donors tax-deductible contributions.
Donors to certain exempt entities may deduct the contributions they make
to these entities against their income in determining their tax due, up to a
percentage limit of their adjusted gross income. 94 For Google Inc., the sole
donor to Google.org, this limit would be ten percent. Finally, organizations
known as nonprofit, charitable, or tax-exempt can experience a halo effect;
they benefit from the general positive association the public has with
charities. However, Google.org's self-styling as a philanthropy, its use of
the ".org" suffix, and the content of its programs may provide it with a
significant glow of its own.
These various benefits often propel philanthropists to use tax-exempt,
nonprofit corporations to pursue their goals. Even standing alone, in
Google's circumstances, they might not have provided sufficient
inducement. Whether or not they are compelling, they are not the reasons
Google.org has cited. The remainder of this part explores the ways
90. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 3.02 (1987) (granting nonprofit
corporations powers to act and transact in the corporate name); id. § 6.12 (limiting members'
liability). Nonprofits may also be organized as charitable trusts or unincorporated
associations. MARILYN E. PHELAN, NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES: CORPORATIONS, TRUSTS, AND
ASSOCIATIONS § 1:03 (2000). In addition, Vermont recently passed legislation permitting
organizations founded with a mix of business and charitable purposes to form as a low-profit
limited liability company (L3C), a new type of hybrid form. Debra E. Blum, Vermont Poised
to Recognize Businesses that Are Created to Offer Social Benefits, 20 CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY 21 (2008). This Essay compares the for-profit philanthropy model with the
nonprofit corporate form, as the latter is by far the most common form used by U.S.
charities. PHELAN, supra.
91. HOWARD OLECK & MARTHA STEWART, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS,
AND ASSOCIATIONS § 7 (6th ed. 1994).
92. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
93. See Victor Fleischer, Urban Entrepreneurship and the Promise of For-Profit
Philanthropy, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 93, 101 (2007); Christopher Lim, Google.org, For-
Profit Charitable Entity: Another Smart Decision by Google?, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
28, 52-54 (2007) (describing this possibility as well as Google.org's potential utility in
avoiding accumulated earnings tax).
94. I.R.C. § 170(c).
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Google.org explains its choice to take the for-profit philanthropy route
instead.
A. Freedom of Investment
One of the major reasons Google.org cites for adopting a for-profit
philanthropy model is the freedom to invest in for-profit businesses in
pursuit of its philanthropic goals. 95 If structured as a traditional nonprofit,
state nonprofit corporate law and federal tax regulation would significantly
limit Google.org's ability to invest in for-profits. Further, these regimes
would restrict the use of any gains Google.org realized on its investments.
Several aspects of state nonprofit corporate law could hinder
Google.org's investment plans. The nondistribution constraint prohibits
nonprofit corporations from distributing net earnings to those with control
over the corporation's decisions. 96 Thus, if Google.org were a nonprofit
corporation, any profits it realized from investments in for-profit companies
would have to be reinvested in the nonprofit's mission, rather than shared
with Google Inc. or its shareholders. Neither Google Inc. nor its investors
could be granted a true equity stake in Google.org. Of course, Google.org
has dismissed any intention to use profits for anything other than future
philanthropy. 97 For it, and for other for-profit philanthropists willing to
make such a commitment, the nondistribution constraint should not be a
reason to avoid the nonprofit form.
State law imperatives regarding permissible nonprofit purposes and
activities, though, could restrain a nonprofit Google.org's freedom of
investment. State law may demand that nonprofit corporations organized
under its auspices have charitable purposes. 98 Furthermore, pecuniary or
commercial purposes or activities might occasionally be limited.99 A
95. About Google.org, supra note 9 ("[W]e can also invest in for-profit endeavors, such
as efforts by companies to develop breakthrough renewable energy technologies.").
96. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 1.40, 13.01 (1987) (prohibiting
payments from nonprofit corporations to their "members, directors, or officers"); see also
Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980)
(coining the term "nondistribution constraint" to describe this prohibition and identifying its
role in an economic rationale for the nonprofit sector).
97. See Hafner, supra note 68 ("All of Google.org's spending, [Google.org then-
Executive Director] Dr. Brilliant said, will be in keeping with its mission, and there is to be
no 'blowback.' That is, should Google.org make a profit with one of its ventures, those
funds will not go to the search engine business, but will stay within Google.org."); Rubin,
supra note 68.
98. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 201(b) (McKinney 2008) (requiring
Type A and B nonprofit corporations to be formed for a range of civic, associational, or
charitable purposes).
99. Compare, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 204 (limiting "activities for
pecuniary profit or financial gain" by nonprofits); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5306(a)(4)
(West 2008) (providing that a nonprofit's articles of incorporation must include "[a]
statement that the corporation is one which does not contemplate pecuniary gain or profit,
incidental or otherwise"), with REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 3.02(16) (stating
that nonprofits incorporated under its auspices "ha[ve] the purpose of engaging in any lawful
activity" and empowering nonprofits "to carry on a business"). See generally JAMES J.
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nonprofit Google.org substantially devoted to investing in for-profit
companies, or developing products or services for eventual sale by a for-
profit entity, could breach these restrictions. However, engaging in some
commercial activities or investing in certain for-profit entities as part of a
wider program pursuing conservation, public health, and poverty reduction
would likely not breach the requirements-especially if all profits are
reinvested in charitable efforts. Still, there is some greater risk in pursuing
these investments as a nonprofit entity than as a for-profit.
Finally, state law regulating nonprofit investment activity could limit a
nonprofit Google.org's freedom of investment. Nonprofit fiduciaries are
bound by the duty of care to manage and invest corporate assets
prudently.100 These investments should make up a portfolio with a risk and
return profile appropriate to the size, goals, and other attributes of the
organization. 101 It is uncertain whether investments in for-profit companies
made for programmatic purposes-to further the mission of the
organization directly, rather than to maintain or increase its assets-would
even be subject to these restrictions. A strong case can be made that these
are program decisions, on which the law defers to nonprofit corporate
fiduciaries so long as there is no self-dealing and leaders and managers
utilize careful and appropriate process in reaching them. Yet, if judged by a
yardstick of prudent investment, investing charitable assets in risky
ventures (even those seeking socially useful goods) may not comply with
fiduciaries' obligations. Taken together, these three state law concepts
would create some hazards for Google.org's investment plans, were it to
organize as a nonprofit corporation.
If Google.org were to seek federal tax benefits, further and more serious
restrictions would apply. Organizing as a nonprofit corporation does not
automatically trigger the tax advantages available to some nonprofits under
federal law, principally income tax exemption and qualification to receive
tax-deductible contributions. To obtain these benefits, Google.org would
have to request, obtain, and maintain tax-exempt status under I.R.C. §
501(c)(3). The federal law constraints on tax-benefited nonprofits would
hinder Google.org's freedom of investment considerably more than would
those under state law.
Federal tax law imposes various limits on the organizational purposes for
which tax benefits will be granted. Statutes and regulations provide a list of
purposes for which an exempt organization must be primarily organized
and operated: "religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international
FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 81 (2006) ("Nonprofit
organizations may conduct activities for pecuniary gain so long as the profit is used for the
organization's exempt purpose and there is no distribution of profits to members or
exploitation of the organization for direct monetary gain.").
100. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS §§ 315, 320(b)(6), 335 (Am.
Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (approved at the 2007 and 2008 American Law
Institute annual meetings).
101. Id. § 335 cmt. (b)(2).
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amateur sports competition..., or for the prevention of cruelty to children
or animals." 10 2  Google.org's goals of pursuing environmental
conservation, public health, and poverty reduction should fit within the
permitted range. However, restrictions apply to exempt organizations'
activities as well. An entity exempt under § 501(c)(3) cannot engage or
even be empowered "to engage, otherwise than as an insubstantial part of
its activities, in activities which in themselves are not in furtherance of one
or more exempt purposes."' 0 3 Such nonexempt activities include engaging
in "a manufacturing business," 104 and other commercial activities will
attract regulators' attention. Regulations explain that
[a]n organization may meet the requirements of section 501(c)(3)
although it operates a trade or business as a substantial part of its
activities, if the operation of such trade or business is in furtherance of the
organization's exempt purpose or purposes and if the organization is not
organized or operated for the primary purpose of carrying on an unrelated
trade or business .... 105
Furthermore, income from an exempt organization's unrelated business
activity is subject to tax.106 There is no outright prohibition, but federal law
clearly looks skeptically upon commercial activity by tax-exempt entities.
Google.org desires the flexibility to invest in for-profit businesses to
further its philanthropic goals. If necessary, Google.org wants the
flexibility to develop this technology itself. Ensuring these activities do not
amount to more than an "insubstantial part" of its program or become
categorized as an "unrelated trade or business" that is its "primary purpose"
might limit this flexibility. The murky commerciality limitations will be
costly to comply with and monitor.10 7 In addition, if business activities are
deemed unrelated to exempt purposes, income from them is taxable,
limiting the tax exemption benefit. It is entirely understandable that
Google.org would want to avoid these federal law limits by opting out of
the federal tax benefit apparatus.
The purpose and commerciality limits hardly stand alone, however; the
private benefit doctrine would further frustrate Google.org's vision. This
doctrine forbids tax-exempt entities from conferring substantial benefits on
unrelated individuals and entities. 10 8  Conferring such a benefit is
102. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2008). Federal law also
includes a prohibition on distributing profits to equity investors. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii).
103. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(l)(i)(b).
104. Id. § 1.501 (c)(3)-l (b)(1)(iii) (emphasis omitted).
105. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(1).
106. I.R.C. § 511; see also Lim, supra note 93, at 35-38 (describing how the
commerciality doctrine and unrelated business income tax would limit Google.org's plans).
107. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 99, at 596 (calling the area "untidy").
108. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (stating that "no part of the net earnings [of a tax-exempt entity
may] inure[] to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual"); see generally John
Simon, Harvey Dale & Laura Chisolm, The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable
Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 267, 282-83 (Walter
W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006) (describing the private benefit doctrine
and distinguishing its cousins, inurement and excess benefit).
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punishable by loss of exemption, cancellation of donors' deductions, and
fines. If any Google.org investment were deemed to confer a substantial
benefit on its for-profit recipient, this would be an improper private benefit
with serious consequences. Thus, Google.org's for-profit investment
strategy is perilous on this ground as well.
If these various limits were not enough, the internal classification system
within tax-exempt status would subject Google.org to even more onerous
restrictions. Each tax-exempt organization qualifying under § 501(c)(3) is
further classified as either a public charity or a private foundation. 10 9
Because of its single funding source, Google.org would be deemed a
private foundation and made subject to a series of additional restrictions on
its activities. Breach of these restrictions triggers initial penalty taxes
assessed against the private foundation and its managers. Confiscatory
additional taxes apply if the relevant transactions are not unraveled.
Google.org's investment plans would likely run afoul of several of the
private foundation restrictions, exposing it to costly penalty tax liability.
Private foundations cannot hold more than twenty percent of the voting
control of any corporation or partnership.1 10 This rule would limit the size
of the investments Google.org could make when funding for-profit
ventures. In addition, private foundations cannot invest any amount in a
manner that would jeopardize the carrying out of their exempt purposes. III
Whether an investment is one that creates such jeopardy is a fact-sensitive
question, and the regulations prize diversification. 112  Google.org's
exclusively high-risk, high-return investment strategy could thus threaten
jeopardy investment liability. So-called "program related investments"
(PRIs) are exempt from designation as jeopardizing exempt purposes, but
only if their primary purpose "is to accomplish one or more of the
[organization's exempt] purposes ... and no significant purpose of [them]
is the production of income or the appreciation of property."" 13 Again,
ensuring its investments fall within the PRI exception would entail both
cost and inherent risk for a nonprofit, tax-exempt Google.org set up as a
private foundation. Even if these risks could be managed, any expenditure
the IRS deemed outside of a private foundation's exempt purposes would
create liability as well. 114 Finally, a Google.org organized as a private
foundation would be required to engage in pre-grant review and post-grant
evaluation of any payments to its for-profit partners and to report on these
109. I.R.C. § 509.
110. Id. § 4943.
111. Id.§ 4944.
112. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2) (2008).
113. I.R.C. § 4944(c) (emphasis added); see also Anita L. Horn, Venture Capital
Philanthropy: The IRS and Treasury Hold the No-Cost Key to the Growth of Self-Sufficient
Nonprofits, in FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF TAXATION REPORT 9-11 (2003)
(offering advice on how nonprofits may make investments in for-profits as part of their
charitable programs without running afoul of tax rules).
114. I.R.C. § 4945.
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findings to the IRS.1 15 Together, these restrictions would create a minefield
for a Google.org organized as a tax-exempt private foundation.
In sum, if organized using traditional philanthropic forms, legal
limitations would create serious barriers for Google.org's freedom to invest.
Various state law restrictions could interfere with Google.org's for-profit
investment strategy. These restrictions would not likely quash
Google.org's plans altogether, but would make them more costly and risky.
Federal tax law would more seriously inhibit Google.org's plans to utilize
and potentially profit from investments in for-profit entities. Its planned
activities would expose it to loss of exemption, as well as significant
penalty tax liability. These restrictions, along with those addressed in the
next two sections, make nonprofit incorporation and tax-exempt status quite
unattractive for Google.org.
B. Direct Access to Google Inc.
Incorporation as a nonprofit, and particularly status as a tax-exempt
private foundation, would also hinder Google.org's desired direct access to
Google Inc.'s resources. On the state law side, again, the potential impact
of the nondistribution constraint, charitable purpose requirements, and the
commerciality restrictions all stem from the same concern. A nonprofit
Google.org could be perceived by state regulators as overly concerned with
the affairs of Google Inc. or to be acting at its behest. If so, regulators
could challenge the bona fides of Google.org's charitable purposes or claim
it had crossed the line into being a commercial entity. If Google Inc. or its
key personnel had control over the affairs of a nonprofit Google.org, it
would be important to ensure that neither Google Inc. nor those key players
received inappropriate distributions. In the same vein, fiduciary obligations
on a nonprofit Google.org's directors and officers would attach liability to
unfair self-dealing. 116 Resource-sharing arrangements would thus need to
be scrutinized to ensure that Google.org received any benefits of such
bargains.
Analogous federal tax law concepts would pose similar obstacles for
direct access. The exempt purpose requirement would be breached by a
substantial purpose to benefit a for-profit business. Although proprietary
activities are permitted, too much intermingling of Google Inc.'s personnel,
technology, and other resources with Google.org would raise alarms
regarding the commerciality limits on tax-exempt entities. Additionally,
the mutually beneficial relationship envisioned by direct access could raise
115. Id. § 4945(h); Garry W. Jenkins, Soft Power, Strategic Security, and International
Philanthropy, 85 N.C. L. REV. 773, 805-06 (2007) (describing the required "expenditure
responsibility" that private foundations must exercise for grants made to entities other than
tax-exempt public charities); see also Horn, supra note 113, at 10 (similar).
116. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL
AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 219-25 (2004); Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary
Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms,
23 J. CORP. L. 631, 646 (1998).
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concerns under the inurement doctrine and the excess benefit statute. The
inurement doctrine bars exempt organizations from distributing net earnings
to insiders with organizational control. 1 7 This inurement ban applies to
any distributions, whether substantial or not, and is punishable by loss of
exemption, but its vagueness and extreme penalty limit its application."
18
The excess benefit statute, I.R.C. § 4958, is more easily applied to curb
similar behavior. It imposes penalty taxes on transactions that provide
excessive benefits to fiduciaries or major donors. 119  Together, these
restrictions would place intermingling of Google Inc. and Google.org
resources under even greater scrutiny than state fiduciary law.
Federal tax law would again, however, have the most dramatic effect on
Google.org if it were classified as a private foundation (as it almost
certainly would be). As a private foundation, especially strict rules would
penalize or prevent sharing of resources between Google.org and Google
Inc., as its sole funder. Among other things, these rules would characterize
as self-dealing any "sale or exchange, or leasing, of property" between
Google.org and Google Inc., even if the transfer were at fair-market price or
better for Google.org. 12°  Likewise, unless Google Inc. "urnish[ed]...
goods, services, or facilities" to Google.org entirely free of charge and to be
used exclusively for charitable purposes, providing such items would be
deemed self-dealing. 12 1  As under the private foundation restrictions
discussed above, self-dealing transactions subject foundations and their
managers to penalty taxes and must be unwound. Thus, Google.org's direct
access plan would be fraught with risk if the entity were set up as a
traditional nonprofit, and particularly dangerous were it deemed a private
foundation. 22
C. Political Activities
Finally, Google.org emphasizes that its choice of a for-profit model
avoids restrictions on its political activities. 123 Federal tax law creates more
severe limitations on political activities by traditionally organized
philanthropic entities, limitations of which nonprofits are aware and often
117. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 116, at 248-49; Fishman, supra note 77, at 584-85.
118. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 116, at 248-50; Fishman, supra note 77, at 585.
119. I.R.C. § 4958; Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4958-1 to 53.4958-8 (2008).
120. I.R.C. § 4941(d)(l)(A). A lease made by Google Inc. to Google.org and entirely
without charge would be permissible under a regulatory exception. Treas. Reg. §
53.4941 (d)-2(b)(2).
121. I.R.C. §§ 4941(d)(l)(C), (2)(C).
122. The Google Foundation experienced some of these difficulties firsthand early in its
life, an experience that in part motivated the formation of Google.org. Kevin J. Delaney,
Google: From Don't Be Evil to How to Do Good, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2008, at B 1 (noting
Google's dismay when it encountered problems donating to One Laptop Per Child, a
"project aimed at increasing Internet access [that] arguably could boost Google's online
advertising revenue").
123. See About Google.org, supra note 9.
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worry over. 124 The extent and dimensions of these limitations are, again,
determined by an organization's precise classification within tax-exempt
status. If Google.org were able to achieve status as a tax-exempt public
charity (an aspiration unlikely to be realized if Google Inc. remained its
sole funder) federal law would allow "no substantial part" of its earnings to
be spent on lobbying. 125 No regulation defines substantial, 126 and few
cases or rulings address it directly. 127 The chilling effect of this uncertainty
leads some charities to elect a series of optional and complex, but more
quantifiable, restrictions. 128  These restrictions require lobbying
expenditures to be maintained below a certain percentage of the entity's
operating budget.129 An entity that exceeds these limits faces penalty
excise taxes; 130 repeated infractions are punishable by revocation of
exemption. 131 In contrast, if a tax-exempt Google.org were deemed a
private foundation, as is most likely, it would not be permitted to lobby at
all.' 32
Regardless of classification, political campaign activities are subject to a
more straightforward ban. 133  Engaging in such activities subjects an
exempt entity to revocation of exempt status, 34 as well as additional
penalty taxes that vary somewhat based on classification.' 35 To complicate
matters further, the line between lobbying and campaign activities under
tax-exempt law does not always align with a lay idea of this border, or even
that set by other legal regimes. One might assume messages about issues of
policy, rather than encouraging support of a particular candidate, would
qualify as lobbying efforts that are curtailed but permitted. Yet, if
Google.org reached out to voters with its views on a policy issue, and it was
124. See Mark Chaves, Laura Stephens & Joseph Galaskiewicz, Does Government
Funding Suppress Nonprofits'Political Activity?, 69 AM. Soc. REV. 292, 297 (2004).
125. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
126. Developments in the Law: Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1578, 1662
(1992).
127. Seasongood v. Comm'r, 227 F.2d 907, 912 (6th Cir. 1955) (holding that less than
five percent of political activity is not substantial); Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133,
1142 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (eschewing a percentage rule).
128. Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation, and Electoral
Politics by Charitable Organizations Under the Internal Revenue Code and Related Laws,
69 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 62-67 & n.379 (2003) (noting groups' claims that the "no substantial
part" test chilled lobbying made in the hearings on the new regime).
129. I.R.C. § 4911(c)(2).
130. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(h)-3 (2008).
131. Id. § 1.501(h)-3(b).
132. Id. § 4945(d)(1) (subjecting any lobbying expenditure by a private foundation to
prohibitive penalty taxes).
133. Id. § 501(c)(3) (noting that "no part of the net earnings of" a tax-exempt public
charity may be used to "participate in, or intervene in ... any political campaign on behalf of
(or in opposition to) any candidate for public office").
134. See, e.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 141-42 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(affirming IRS revocation of a church's exempt status due to campaign activities).
135. I.R.C. § 4955 (taxing campaign expenditures by any exempt organization); id. §
4945(d)(2) (subjecting campaign activity by a private foundation to prohibitive penalty
taxes).
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one about which candidates differed, these efforts might well be
characterized as campaign activities subject to an outright ban. 136
The extent to which state nonprofit law would check Google.org's
involvement in politics is less clear than the obvious federal law obstacles.
Still, state law poses risks for nonprofit corporations engaged in political
activities. State courts generally permit nonprofits with political purposes
or activities to maintain their status, but the tone of their pronouncements
remains skeptical.137  Further, under various state court tests, political
activities will at some point disqualify a nonprofit organization from tax
benefits under state law. 138
Although Google.org does not mention a specific desire to participate in
political campaigns, it highlights plans "to lobby for policies that support
[its] philanthropic goals" as part of its rationale for choosing for-profit
charity. 139 Federal tax law would chafe any plans to do so directly, even if
Google.org were classified as one of the organizations with relatively
liberal restrictions on political activities. The most likely classification for
a nonprofit, tax-exempt Google.org-a private foundation-would require
it to abandon virtually all plans for political activity. State corporate law
would create additional suspicion around these political activities. Of
course, if organized as a private foundation, Google.org could still rely on
Google Inc. to engage in any political activities necessary to support its
philanthropic objectives, and corporate foundations frequently avail
themselves of this technique. 140  Still, by opting out of traditional
philanthropic forms, Google.org is able to pursue political activities as it
sees fit to achieve its social goals, and may do so on its own.
The legal restraints on nonprofit, tax-exempt entities would interfere with
major strands of the Google.org vision. They would limit Google.org's
ability to invest in for-profit ventures in pursuit of its philanthropic goals.
They would scrutinize and, at times, punish its use of and access to Google
Inc. resources to support its activities. They would constrain, if not entirely
136. Several revenue rulings provide a structure whereby publication of a politician's
stated views and voting records may qualify as prohibited political campaign activity
depending on the range of issues addressed, the neutrality of presentation, and the timing of
the publication. See Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73; Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178.
137. See, e.g., Register of Wills v. Cook, 216 A.2d 542, 549 (Md. 1966); Jackson v.
Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 555 (1867).
138. See, e.g., In re Westboro Baptist Church, 189 P.3d 535, 554 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008)
(noting that "our Supreme Court has determined that political action or activities are not
considered a religious activity" in affirming a denial of tax exemption for personal property
owned by a religious group, but used for political purposes); New England Legal Found. v.
City of Boston, 670 N.E.2d 152, 158-59 & n.8 (Mass. 1996) (specifically declining to
"embark on a path of adopting the detailed Federal rules and regulations of political
organizations" but asserting that its state law also precludes tax exemption for organizations
at some level of political activity); Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. Twp. of Lansing,
378 N.W.2d 737, 743 n.6 (Mich. 1985) (noting that, while the instant organization's
lobbying activities would not prevent it from obtaining state tax exemption, "certain forms
of lobbying may preclude a tax exemption").
139. About Google.org, supra note 9.
140. I thank Garry Jenkins for this insight.
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prohibit, Google.org from engaging in political action to promote its
philanthropic mission. Google Inc.'s decision to eschew traditional
charitable forms to pursue its philanthropic endeavors is thus easily
understood. The mismatch of its philanthropic vision and the legal
limitations imposed on traditional charitable forms should encourage a
discourse about whether these limitations represent good policy choices or
unduly restrict philanthropic activities. The next part begins to address
these fundamental issues, as well as some more pragmatic concerns raised
by the for-profit philanthropy model.
IV. CONCERNS RAISED BY FOR-PROFIT PHILANTHROPY
The for-profit philanthropy model raises an array of concerns for those
steeped in the traditions of nonprofit and for-profit law alike. Of course,
nonprofit law will not apply to for-profit philanthropy divisions directly, 141
but taking a nonprofit law perspective brings out important pragmatic
concerns about this new model. This perspective forces one to ask
questions about the availability and suitability of enforcement mechanisms
for for-profit philanthropy. Nonprofit law's focus on mission, and its
concern for constraining mission evolution, pose further challenges for the
for-profit philanthropy model. A for-profit law perspective reveals
different but likewise important pragmatic concerns--ones for-profit
philanthropists will need to address because for-profit law will actually
apply to these entities. For-profit law's shareholder primacy norm and its
concern over protecting investors are certainly implicated by the for-profit
philanthropy model. Further, this model tests the limits of fiduciary
discretion. Finally, the for-profit philanthropy model and the Google.org
example expose fundamental issues regarding the law's construction of a
boundary between nonprofit and for-profit endeavor, and whether its
present location is well-charted.
A. Nonprofit Law's Perspective
Drawing on nonprofit legal sources and debates, three major strains of
concern arise from the for-profit philanthropy model. Does for-profit
philanthropy perilously evade enforcement measures? Will it
inappropriately blur or influence philanthropic mission? Can it mislead
partners, beneficiaries, or the public? The answers to these questions are
neither easy nor crystalline. Contending with them uncovers issues that for-
141. There are legal regimes in which this division would not be as clear. For example,
under English law, organizations do not come under the Charity Commission's regulation by
their positive choice. Rather, a charity is "any institution, corporate or not, which is
established for charitable purposes." Nuzhat Malik, Defining "Charity" and "Charitable
Purposes" in the United Kingdom, INT'L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., Nov. 2008, at 36, 36 (citing
L. B. CURZON, DICTIONARY OF LAW 52 (1979)). Under such a regime, Google.org might not
be so easily able to opt out of traditional philanthropic regulation. I thank Debra Morris for
this insight.
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profit philanthropists and nonprofit advocates should monitor, to ensure this
new model operates to enhance philanthropy.
Placement of philanthropic activity inside a for-profit entity immediately
sparks questions about enforcement, a major preoccupation of nonprofit law
and scholarship. 142 Its structure puts philanthropic activity conspicuously
outside the oversight of both state attorneys general and federal tax
regulators traditionally charged with monitoring philanthropic
organizations. Of course, as detailed in Part III, this is quite deliberate.
Google.org's structure is a response to the scrutiny and penalties these
regulators would place on its plans to invest in for-profit entities, directly
access Google Inc.'s resources, and engage in political activities. In order
to pursue these strategies, Google.org needs to be outside of their
jurisdiction.
State and federal regulators, however, have a fairly broad mandate. They
are empowered to protect charitable assets, prevent donor fraud, safeguard
the reputation of the charitable sector, and police the benefits nonprofits are
given. 143 To do so, these regulators can engage in front-end review of
charitable purpose. They can consider changes to purpose when governing
documents are amended, when major transactions occur, or when an entity
dissolves. 144 They can prosecute fiduciaries when self-dealing transactions
do, in fact, disadvantage philanthropic entities.1 45  They can require
disclosure of internal policies, spending decisions, and program choices for
regulatory, donor, and public review. 146 In its effort to escape a few
particularly troublesome restrictions imposed by nonprofit law and federal
tax-exemption requirements, for-profit philanthropy avoids this broad
regulatory framework entirely.
Without the constraints of state nonprofit or federal tax law, a for-profit
philanthropy might misbehave badly. It could squander or misuse
philanthropic assets, confuse partners or the public as to its goals or
activities, even deleteriously impact the reputation of the charitable sector,
without any sanction. For-profit accountability mechanisms offer some
promise for keeping these entities honest. Shareholder suits or offers for
control might prevent or punish embezzlement or other direct self-dealing
harms that ultimately impact the for-profit's bottom line. In addition, the
pure self-interest of a for-profit philanthropy like Google.org-in achieving
142. Shruti Rana, From Making Money Without Doing Evil to Doing Good Without
Handouts: The Google.org Experiment in Philanthropy, 3 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 87, 93-96
(2008).
143. Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law
Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 946-50 (2004) (addressing the enforcement prerogatives of
state attorneys general).
144. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 11.02, 12.02, 14.03 (1987)
(providing nonprofits must notify the state attorney general prior to merger, sale of
substantially all assets, or dissolution).
145. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 116, at 309 (describing the range of court actions
available to state attorneys general ).
146. James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218, 239-
42 (2003) (describing state and federal disclosure and filing requirements).
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its own stated and well-publicized goals-should encourage it to pursue
accountability. If it is part of a highly visible public company, a for-profit
philanthropy division will be subject to some public scrutiny. Still, the for-
profit form provides only limited and structured transparency, geared to
investors rather than the public at large. 147  Further, none of these
mechanisms are likely to challenge Google.org if it strays from or lags on
its philanthropic course. 148 For-profit philanthropy's potential avoidance of
enforcement regimes therefore remains concerning and merits continued
observation.
Importantly, though, this concern is tempered by the fact that nonprofit
regulators engage in a relatively low level of enforcement. In fact, the
dearth of resources state attorneys general bring to their nonprofit
enforcement efforts is oft-cited and the subject of frequent criticism in the
nonprofit legal literature. 149 Federal regulators offer somewhat greater
enforcement wherewithal than their state counterparts. This relative
advantage, however, still leaves them with meager financial, human, and
technological resources to achieve their tasks. 150  Due to standing
limitations, members of the public rarely may bring enforcement suits
against philanthropic organizations or their leaders. 151  Without more
resources available in the nonprofit enforcement architecture, Google.org's
decision to opt out creates lower accountability costs than might be
imagined.
The perspectives of nonprofit law and scholarship also draw out several
mission-based concerns regarding the for-profit philanthropy model.
Combining for-profit attributes with traditionally nonprofit activities is the
point of for-profit philanthropy. This might make philanthropic activities
more efficient, but it could also blur mission in unintended and undesirable
ways. For-profit philanthropy's embrace of business methods may put
additional pressure on entities like Google.org to measure their
performance.1 52  But, performance metrics for nonprofit production are
147. See Rana, supra note 142, at 95.
148. Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure
Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 205, 212-15 (2004)
(articulating the accountability problem created by mission creep).
149. See, e.g., FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 116, at 352 (noting that state attorneys general
have achieved some nonprofit enforcement successes and "[a]ll of them operate with
severely limited budgets, which has meant a shortage of legal and accounting support");
Fishman, supra note 146, at 262-63 (addressing the limitations on nonprofit enforcement
presented by scarce governmental resources).
150. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 116, at 459-61 (describing the challenges federal
regulators face); Evelyn Brody, Accountability and Public Trust, in THE STATE OF
NONPROFIT AMERICA 471, 479 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002) ("Funding for charity
enforcement has never been high, at either the state or federal level .... ").
151. Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of
Charitable Fiduciaries?, 23 J. CORP. L. 655, 657 (1998) (noting that standing to challenge
fiduciary breaches by anyone other than the attorney general and fellow fiduciaries is
extremely limited).
152. Rana, supra note 142, at 94.
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notoriously slippery and contested. 153 Some of Google.org's initiatives
provide obvious opportunities for benchmarking progress. If a plug-in
vehicle produced through RechargelT becomes viable for even small-scale
production, this would certainly be an achievement. Likewise, RE<C might
chart its progress as greater efficiencies in electricity production are
achieved by processes it develops or funds. Often, though, identifying and
measuring milestones will be far more complicated. Perhaps a count of
emerging disease hot spots identified would track the PnP initiative's
success. Or, perhaps a small advance in the understanding of the basic
science relating to disease mutation is the proper target. There is always a
danger with performance measures that an inapt one will be selected. Even
if good choices are made, the risk of overemphasizing metrics remains.
Concentrating on achieving the measures can become an organization's
whole purpose, eclipsing and blinding it to broader goals or alternative
visions of success. These risks exist for nonprofit entities as well, of
course. The call to use business methods to reengineer philanthropy in
search of greater efficiency, however, suggests that the dilemma over
performance measures will be particularly acute in for-profit philanthropy.
Philanthropy advocates would do well to monitor this issue as for-profit
philanthropy grows.
The for-profit philanthropy model could also undesirably skew mission
in other ways. What begins as a philanthropic mission could, as a result of
it being embedded within a business, become biased toward alignment with
the goals of the for-profit company. This is not to suggest any nefarious
intent. Rather, a for-profit philanthropy division's position within the larger
organizational culture, along with its desire to take advantage of its direct
access to the for-profit's resources and technology, could well cause slow
but steady drift in mission toward service of for-profit goals. One could
herald this type of development as welcome synergy. Indeed, some
commentators suggest that both business and social goals can be enhanced
by integrating philanthropy more fully with overall corporate strategy. 154
In important ways, though, this integration might degrade the idea of
corporate philanthropy. 155 If "philanthropic" expenditures are made to
153. Patrice Flynn & Virginia A. Hodgkinson, Measuring the Contributions of the
Nonprofit Sector, in MEASURING THE IMPACT OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 3, 15 (Patrice Flynn
& Virginia A. Hodgkinson eds., 2001); Rosabeth Moss Kanter & David V. Summers, Doing
Well While Doing Good: Dilemmas of Performance Measurement in Nonprofit
Organizations and the Need for a Multiple-Constituency Approach, in THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 154, 154-59 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987).
154. CTR. FOR CORP. CITIZENSHIP, STRATEGIC PHILANTHROPY: THE BUSINESS VALUE OF
CONTRIBUTIONS 1 (2004) (describing the value of "align[ing] charitable activities.., with a
social issue or cause that supports their business objectives").
155. See, e.g., COMM. ENCOURAGING CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY, BUSINESS'S SOCIAL
CONTRACT: CAPTURING THE CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY OPPORTUNITY 23-24 (2008)
(arguing, based on a McKinsey study, that "[t]he most efficient philanthropists are also
seeking to make their philanthropy congruent with the business footprint"); Michael E.
Porter & Mark R. Kramer, The Competitive Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy, HARV.
BUS. REV., Dec. 2002, at 5, 7-8.
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improve the lot of the corporation and its shareholders, they are hardly a
gift to humankind. More importantly, if this drifting effect indeed skews
deployment of philanthropic resources to only those social issues that neatly
align with for-profit imperatives, there is real cause for concern. Again,
this concern is not limited to the for-profit philanthropy domain. 156
Corporate foundations are subject to similar criticism for shifting mission
from original unrelated philanthropic goals toward ones more closely
aligned with the branding and ideals of the for-profit company.157 The for-
profit philanthropy model, by bringing traditionally nonprofit activities
within business operations, would only enhance this effect. Again,
contemplation and monitoring are warranted.
The ultimate mission-based fear raised by the for-profit philanthropy
model is that resources contributed with much fanfare to achievement of
philanthropic aims could, one day, be recaptured by the for-profit and used
instead for profit-making purposes. 158 Such recapture is not possible if
resources are gifted to a separately incorporated nonprofit. It simply could
not be done with a tax-exempt private foundation, even a corporate
foundation with many overlapping leaders and with significant interaction
between the company and the foundation. And, it is important to note,
Google.org and its leaders vehemently object to any suggestion it would
happen there. Perhaps not, but no legal obstacle would prevent Google.org
from doing so. Moreover, future adopters of the for-profit philanthropy
model might not be so willing to dedicate their resources irreversibly to
their philanthropic stream.
The possibility of recapture, of course, will not necessarily reduce overall
corporate expenditures on philanthropy. It may instead be beneficial to
allow companies to contribute resources to philanthropic endeavors only for
as long as they are so inclined. On the one hand, the ability to recapture
these assets for profit-making purposes at a later time might increase
corporate willingness to fund philanthropic activities in the current period.
It might expand the range of social aims companies are willing to bankroll
or encourage greater experimentation. On the other hand, meeting
philanthropic goals often requires sustained attention and stability. The risk
that funds might be cut off at any time could curtail the scale of for-profit
philanthropists' efforts, or undesirably limit their goals' scope and
ambition. These are empirical questions that merit further exploration.
Finally, the nonprofit law perspective highlights concerns about
misleading customers, partners, and the public. Protecting donors and
others from nonprofit frauds or schemes is a crucial concern of nonprofit
156. See, e.g., Debra C. Minkoff & Walter W. Powell, Nonprofit Mission: Constancy,
Responsiveness, or Deflection?, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 108, at 591, 606
(describing how a nonprofit's donors may induce mission changes).
157. Cf Linda Sugin, Encouraging Corporate Charity, 26 VA. TAX REV. 125, 144-51
(2006) (arguing that the alignment of corporate philanthropy with business goals makes
these expenditures more appropriately deductible as business expenses than as charitable
gifts).
158. See Fishman, supra note 77, at 607.
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law. 159 The recapture possibility elicits real concerns about how for-profit
philanthropists describe and publicize their activities. The idea that funds
once contributed may be taken back for the donor's private use does not
track with the traditional idea of charitable giving. Characterizing as for-
profit philanthropy an activity marked by this flexibility misuses the term.
Without a real commitment to restrain recapture of ostensibly donated
funds, the for-profit philanthropy concept risks casting future adopters of
the model as unduly charitable. If for-profit philanthropists free ride on the
positive associations of the philanthropic community, they may mislead
customers, partners, or the public generally. They may even dilute or
damage these associations, at a point when they are already showing
wear. 160 Like all of the mission-related concerns outlined here, for-profit
philanthropists and philanthropy advocates should carefully mind these
issues.
B. For-Profit Law's Perspective
The perspective of for-profit law exposes a range of other concerns about
the for-profit philanthropy model. The model tests the strength of the
shareholder primacy norm and the limits of fiduciary discretion. Is
philanthropy, when taken this far, still a valid corporate objective? Can the
decision to create a philanthropic division be sustained as a proper exercise
of fiduciary responsibility? Likely yes on both counts, and for mostly
familiar reasons. The Google.org example, however, expands on these
rationales and offers some guidance for future for-profit philanthropists.
A for-profit legal perspective quickly seizes upon the shareholder
primacy challenge that for-profit philanthropy represents. As a for-profit
corporation, the primary objective of Google Inc. is to make profits for its
shareholders. 16 1  These profits may be obtained by shareholders
immediately, through dividends or rises in stock price, or over the long
term, when reinvestment in the corporation leads to growth in its value.
Google Inc., of course, is pursuing profits doggedly, but not exclusively. It
is also pursuing philanthropic goals through Google.org. The debate over
whether and to what extent corporations should expend funds and resources
for purposes other than increasing shareholder value has raged for
decades. 162 The creation of a division specifically devoted to pursuit of
159. Brody, supra note 143, at 947 (noting this was reported as state regulators' "biggest
problem").
160. Suzanne Perry, Public Confidence in Nonprofit Groups Slides Back, New Survey
Finds, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Apr. 3, 2008, at 3.
161. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01
(Am. Law Inst. 1994) (noting that "a corporation... should have as its objective the conduct
of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain"); see
also Elhauge, supra note 73, at 745 (accepting without argument that "managers' primary
obligation is and should be to make profits").
162. See generally Branson, supra note 71; Wells, supra note 71. A particular resurgence
in this debate arose after states' adoption of corporate constituency statutes in the 1990s.
Wells, supra note 71, at 125-29.
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social rather than shareholder returns raises these issues more pointedly. 163
Google Inc.'s especially shareholder-resistant corporate structure makes
shareholder primacy concerns even more vivid. Under its dual class
structure, one class of its common stock provides a single vote per share
and is held by most shareholders; a second class of common stock, with ten
votes per share, is held primarily by insiders. 164 The structure thereby
entrenches control with a few manager-owners, insulating it from the
shareholder pressure and threat of hostile takeovers that enforce the
shareholder primacy norm. 165
In the main, though, Google.org could be easily defended using
traditional responses to shareholder primacy arguments opposing corporate
charitable contributions. Google Inc.'s corporate do-gooding meshes with
its non-"evil" brand positioning. Google.org seems likely to enhance
Google Inc.'s standing with consumers and potential partners. Its design of
a new model for corporate philanthropy aligns with its reputation for
innovation. This reputation is key to Google Inc.'s strategy for recruiting
and inspiring the highly prized and sought after technical job force its
business requires. Many other businesses could likewise use such claims to
support efforts to create for-profit philanthropy divisions in their own
corporations.
Google Inc. can add an additional argument to the mix: notice. Its plans
regarding the extent of the company's philanthropic reach have been public
and long-standing, dating from its initial public offering. Its pledge then to
commit one percent of equity and profits to philanthropy informed all
would-be Google Inc. shareholders of the company's broad philanthropic
orientation. Any shareholders disdaining such use of their capital could
have looked elsewhere to invest. Google Inc.'s capital and control structure
were likewise detailed in these early documents, and have continued to be
transparent to investors who cared to inquire. Shareholders thus purchased
with notice, and Google Inc. need not hear them complain. In fact, some
shareholders may have purchased because of Google Inc.'s philanthropic
commitment and would want to hold the company to its promises. 166
Disclosure is the bedrock of federal securities law; it provides Google Inc. a
strong defense to any claim that Google.org breaches protections for
investors. This notice strategy is also relatively easy to copy, though more
163. Stone, supra note 11 (reporting that the announcement of Google's entry into the
renewable energy field was greeted by some concern on the part of investors and analysts).
164. VISE & MALSEED, supra note 2, at 172.
165. Id.; Letter from the Founders, supra note 6, at 29-30. A shareholder proposal to end
the dual-class structure was defeated in 2006. See Google Keeps Two-Tier Ownership
Structure, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/ll/technology/
12google-wire.html?pagewanted=print.
166. The B corporation certification system is premised on the idea that shareholders will
be able to enforce just such claims. See B Corporation, http://bcorporation.net/ (last visited
Feb. 13, 2009).
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so for companies just making shares available to the public than for
established public corporations.' 67
The questions raised by fiduciary obligation, another persistent for-profit
law theme, also can be quickly answered. In most cases, the only
potentially viable shareholder claim for breach of fiduciary duty is for a
lapse in loyalty. Like in any other for-profit entity, a shareholder could
claim that fiduciaries are engaged in embezzlement, taking of corporate
opportunities, or the like. Existing for-profit fiduciary law could deal with
these claims as effectively in a company engaging in for-profit philanthropy
as in one with more traditional activities. Unique to the for-profit
philanthropy context, however, would be shareholder claims that the for-
profit philanthropy division is merely a veiled perquisite for a company's
directors or officers. Such claims would argue the company undertook
philanthropic activities for the benefit of these fiduciaries, but using
corporate assets. This type of case is theoretically possible, but difficulties
of proof as well as law would make its success unlikely. It would be quite
hard to demonstrate that philanthropic activity was for the benefit of a
fiduciary, not the company.' 68 Even if proof could be made, if the
philanthropic expenditure when added to the fiduciary's compensation was
still within a reasonable range, there would be little harm.
Claims under the duty of care have even lower chances of success.
Initially, the complex procedural obstacles to bringing them would stymie
shareholder plaintiffs challenging for-profit philanthropy. The standard of
review in duty of care suits poses further obstacles. Provided that
fiduciaries take decisions in an informed, good faith, and nonconflicted
manner, the business judgment rule requires only that they act rationally.
This highly deferential standard would generally protect decisions by for-
profit directors and managers to pursue social ends, as either efficiently
unreviewable business judgments or in pursuit of long-term benefits for the
corporation. 169 Creating a for-profit philanthropy division can be seen as
merely a new take on relatively uncontroversial business activities like
charitable contributions and CSR, and likewise can withstand scrutiny
under the duty of care.
Even without resort to efficiency arguments or the philanthropic high
ground, however, the decision to fund Google.org should fall well within
the broad range of rational decisions. Despite its claims that it is
unconcerned with the return on its investments, Google Inc. is certainly
more likely to profit from its for-profit philanthropy initiatives than it
would from making charitable donations of the same magnitude. The
167. Companies frequently disclose their philanthropic activities to shareholders already,
for the dual purposes of disclosure and public relations.
168. See Elhauge, supra note 73, at 834.
169. Id. at 783-814 (arguing these decisions are well within directors' and managers'
discretion); Kerr, supra note 77, at 668 (concluding that fiduciaries' decisions responding to
social concerns will be protectable as ultimately beneficial to the corporation and its
shareholders).
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division could be viewed as just one part of a diversified portfolio of
corporate investments. This division pursues extremely high-risk, but
potentially very high-return, projects. If Google.org finds a way to produce
one gigawatt of electricity cheaper than coal, or to prevent and predict
diseases of grave concern to public health worldwide, these achievements
could be translated into significant profits. Of course, these endeavors are
great challenges and may come to nothing. But, that is true of many
corporate projects. Provided corporate leaders used the appropriate process
in considering the matter, they would be acting well within the standard of
care to create a for-profit philanthropy division like Google.org. It uses a
relatively low overall financial investment to pursue projects unlikely to
pan out, but that, if successful, could expand its business exponentially, not
unlike some research and development units.
Of course, according to statements by its leaders, the profits Google.org's
investments might earn will not translate into income for Google Inc.'s
shareholders or the profit-making arms of its business. There is no reason
not to take them at their word. Perhaps shareholders might argue that a
potential investment return only supports a finding of rationality if that
return would benefit the shareholders. 170 Still, the for-profit philanthropy
structure leaves the reinvestment decision open for reconsideration if and
when such profits might materialize. Moreover, although Google remains
committed to keeping any Google.org profits in the philanthropic stream, it
appears willing to use the philanthropy's first mover position in some of
these emerging areas to serve a kind of investment research and
development function for Google Inc. For example, recent reports suggest
that following Google.org's investment in renewable energy startups,
Google Inc. is considering making larger scale investments on behalf of its
for-profit business. 171 For future for-profit philanthropists, the door also
remains open to forego any kind of reinvestment commitment.
Finally, one could conceivably question whether for-profit philanthropy
could undermine the value of the for-profit corporate form more generally.
Substantial benefits accrue to for-profit corporations in recognition of the
role they play in producing economic vitality. 172 If for-profit philanthropy
so seriously distracted the captains of industry that it undermined this trade-
off, it would be cause for distress. Of course, the same fear could be raised
with regard to corporate contributions, corporate social responsibility, and
social enterprise. And, it would be similarly overstated. None of these
examples blending business and philanthropy pose such catastrophic
threats. They do not adopt, or even advocate, a wholesale abandonment of
170. I thank Adam Parachin for this insight.
171. See Miguel Helft, Idealists and a Green Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2008, at BI
(noting that Google Inc. may follow Google.org's lead in investing in renewable energy and
reporting that a recent status meeting on energy included employees from philanthropic and
other divisions).
172. Not least of these is limited liability, which can stimulate investment and foster risk
taking, all in service of greater efficiency. CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATIONS § 1.1 (1986);
Cox, HAZEN & O'NEAL, supra note 60, § 7.2.
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the role of business in building economic prosperity. It remains to be seen
whether a trend toward more nonprofit and for-profit hybridization is
forming. Today, at Google Inc. and elsewhere, outlays on philanthropy are
still tiny compared to those spent developing, producing, and marketing
products and services. Moreover, depending on whether the global
economic crisis persists or deepens, philanthropic expenditures may
diminish as companies feel far less flush with funds to allocate to social
goals.' 7 3 For-profit philanthropy, like its forbears, seems highly unlikely to
be the undoing of the business-driven economy.
The pragmatic legal questions a for-profit perspective brings to mind can
thus fairly easily be answered. Indeed, other commentators find the for-
profit philanthropy model of so little concern that they argue for
encouraging these efforts by extending tax benefits to reach them.
Professors Eric Posner and Anup Malani argue that none of the rationales
supporting tax benefits for philanthropic activities can justify premising
these benefits on the adoption of a nonprofit form. 174 Thus, they propose
decoupling nonprofit form from tax benefits based on social activities, and
opening these benefits to any type of entity engaging in activities that
benefit the community.' 7 5 Only time will tell if for-profit philanthropy will
figure largely in the corporate mainstream. If Posner and Malani's
prescription is not adopted, other for-profits may be unwilling to give up
the tax and other benefits attendant to structuring their philanthropy along
more traditional legal lines. Assuming refinement and replication of the
model do occur, for-profit legal concerns should not create serious
obstacles.
C. Fundamental Concerns About the Nonprofit/For-Profit Boundary
The for-profit philanthropy model and the Google.org example do,
however, highlight a more fundamental issue: the utility of the legal
boundary between nonprofit and for-profit endeavor. There is a real and
evident mismatch between Google Inc.'s philanthropic vision and the legal
restrictions on traditional forms for philanthropic activity. This divergence
exposes fundamental policy choices around how the law structures, and
thereby encourages, philanthropic activity. These policy choices have
delineated several key boundaries between what is philanthropy and what is
not:
Philanthropy is qualitatively different than commercial
activity. It produces something different from, perhaps
larger than, products and services.
173. Thus far, Google.org has stated that its response to the current economic crisis will
be more, rather than less, philanthropic funding. See Posting of Sonal Shah to The Official
Google.org Blog, supra note 21 ("We know that the global financial crisis is
disproportionately affecting the poor and plan to increase our overall giving in 2009.").
174. See generally Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93
VA. L. REv. 2017 (2007).
175. Id. at 2065.
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* Philanthropy defines a charitable class and provides the
benefits of its success to them, not to equity investors, not
to leaders or managers, not even to unrelated parties if they
are outside the benefited class. It embodies at least this
basic level of altruism.
* Philanthropy is not engaging in the political system. It is
working for change in some more direct or at least
different way, without becoming embroiled in political
processes that might taint or overtake a charitable mission.
Because the law is complex and sometimes confused and because
organizations cannot be expected to fulfill the philanthropic ideal to
perfection, the boundaries are muddy. There are exceptions. Limited
incursions across them are permitted or overlooked. But, these boundaries
are there.
The for-profit philanthropy model does not just push or question the
boundaries the law has placed on philanthropy. It ignores the map
altogether. Google.org shows that structural innovation can limit the
potency of the law's boundaries. It defies the law's attempt to chart human
endeavor into easy categories of public or private, other-regarding or self-
regarding, noble or base. In doing so, for-profit philanthropy raises serious
questions about whether the boundaries the law has placed on traditional
charitable forms represent the right policy choices. Exposing these
fundamental questions may ultimately be for-profit philanthropy's greatest
contribution to nonprofit law and the philanthropic community. Full
exploration of the theoretical implications of this revelation will continue
beyond this Essay, in my future work, and hopefully that of others.
CONCLUSION
Google.org's for-profit philanthropy model is the most recent in a long
line of phenomena blending nonprofit and for-profit endeavor. The
persistence of corporate charitable contributions and corporate social
responsibility initiatives, as well as the advent of social enterprise and the
new advocates of philanthrocapitalism, 176 suggest innovation may well
continue in this direction. For-profit philanthropy's innovation is mainly
structural, placing philanthropic activity in-house, as a division of a for-
profit company. This structure responds to reasonable concerns about the
feasibility of pursuing Google Inc.'s particular philanthropic vision and
program through traditional charitable forms. Its novel approach, however,
raises real questions about nonprofit and for-profit law and the boundary
these regimes establish between their constituents. Through its examination
of these questions, this Essay provides signposts for the evaluation of for-
profit philanthropy. More work must be done to better understand and
guide the legal impact of for-profit philanthropy, especially if it becomes
176. See supra note 88.
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subject to widespread replication. Until then, the Google.org example
offers valuable insight on the undertheorized boundary between nonprofits
and for-profits.
Notes & Observations
